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The Union of South Africa, the youngest of the self-governing
Dominions within the British Empire,1 came into being on the thirty-
first of May, I9IO, the eighth anniversary of the Treaty of Vereeniging,
which concluded the Anglo-Boer War of I899-i9O2, and recognized
the annexation of the two Boer Republics, the South African Republic
(or Transvaal) and the Orange Free State, to the British Crown. The
Union, therefore, is barely twelve years old, and for four years of that
time has had to live through the abnormal conditions of a world-wide
war. It would be surprising, in these circumstances, if the process of
growth had not .in some respects been arrested or set back. The develop-
ment in South Africa of a homogeneous sentiment of national existence
within the Empire might have been more marked if there had been no
war to check it. But by the lawyer the ebb and flow of political move-
ment can happily be disregarded except so far as they affect directly the
legal processes which form the subject of his study. These processes, as
exhibited in South Africa at the present day, are of peculiar interest.
They present a picture of a system of law in the making. Seldom have
the courts of any country enjoyed the opportunity which the courts of
South Africa now enjoy, of moulding the laws to their will, inspired
but not hampered by tradition, aided .but not checked by the legislator.
For, as we shall see, though the Union Parliament has not been inactive
in consolidating the laws of the Union, the task of directing the course
of legal development has principally rested with the courts of justice.
Before proceeding to details, a few words may be in place with regard
to the several organs of legal change.
The Constitution of the Union is the most perfect type of a self-
governing Dominion. Brought into being, like the Dominion of
Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia, by an Act of the Imperial
Parliament,2 it differs from the first in having within itself unlimited
power of constitutional change, and from the second in being a union
and not confederation, and in the fact that constitutional changes
(with one exception) 3 can be effected without any special formality of
enactment. The laws that we shall speak of relate rather to "civil
rights and property" than to constitutional questions, but it'is impor-
'The constitution of the Irish Free State had not been settled when this was
written.
'South Africa Act (igog) 9 Edw. VII, c. 9.
* South Africa Act, supra note 2, sec. 35.
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tant to observe that within its territorial limits the legislative authority
of the Union Parliament is as "omnipotent" as that of the British
Parliament itself. The refusal of the Governor-General to assent to a
bill passed by both Houses and overriding legislation by the Imperial
Parliament are indeed constitutional possibilities, but scarcely of the
kind which lie within the range of practical policy. The judicial
organization of'the Union differs from the legislative in that the ulti-
mate court of judicature is not situated within the Union. The South
Africa Act, Section io6, while excluding an appeal as. of course, leaves
unimpaired the right of the King in Council (in other words, of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) to grant special leave to
carry appeals from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court to this
body, which in practice consists mainly of judges whose professional
experience lies within the limits of the United Kingdom. But recent
pronouncements of this tribunal point to the conclusion that, except in
matters of grave constitutional concern, leave to appeal will generally
be refused. We may take it, therefore, that, for most purposes, the
interpretation no less than the enactment of the laws of the Union will
fall entirely within the competence of local authority. The highest
importance, therefore, attaches to the decisions of the Appellate Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court of South Africa, upon which is cast the
weighty task of creating a common law for the whole of British South
Africa south of the Zambesi and for the mandated territory, formerly
German South West Africa. Appeals lie to this court from: (I) the
Provincial and Local Divisions of the Supreme Court of the Union;4
(2) the High Court of Southern Rhodesia;5 (3) the Native High
Court of Natal;8 and (4) the High Court of the mandated territory
officially known as the Protectorate of South-west Africa.7
Before proceeding to a detailed examination of the work accom-
plished by the Legislature and the courts of the Union during the past
twelve years, a few words will not be out of place with regard to the
state of the law in the four colonies, which formed the original consti-
tuent members of the Union. The Colony of the Cape of Good .Hope
had been British since i8o6, the title of Great'Britain, founded upon
cession and conquest, having been confirmed by the Treaty of London
of the thirteenth of August, 1814. In accordance with invariable
constitutional practice the existing legal system of the country remained
in force. But this statement must be accepted with qualifications.
From the very first, British influences asserted themselves., This was,
for example, the case as regards the more barbarous features of the
Dutch criminal law and in respect to the administration of estates, the
universal successor of the civil law being replaced by the testamentary
'South Africa Act, supra note 2, sec. 103.
'Ibid.
'Union of South Africa Sts. 1911, Act. No. i.
"Union of South Africa Sts. I92o, Act. No. 12.
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executor of the English type. At the same time the local legislation of
the Dutch governors of the Cape, as well as the enactments of the Dutch
East India Company and of its Governor-General, whose seat was at
Batavia in the island of Java, received scant attention from the British
rulers. These circumstances tended to confirm the authority of the
principal text-books, in which tile jurists of the Netherlands had
expounded the mixed system to which Van Leeuwen in the seventeenth
century had given the name of Roman-Dutch Law. Chief amongst
these were Grotius' Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland,8
written in 162o, and published in 1631; the two works of Van Leeuwen,
the Censura Forensis and the Roman-Dutch Law, published in 1662
and 1664, respectively; and the Cominentarius ad Pandectas, of
Joannes Voet, published in 1698-1704. The eighteenth century did
not produce any systematic treatises comparable to the above, though
one must not pass over in silence the commentary of Schorer on
Grotius (1767) and of Decker on Van Leeuwen (I78O),9 and at the
beginning of the nineteenth century the useful works of Van der Linden
and of Van der Keessel, the first a practising advocate of Amsterdam,
the second a professor of law in the University of Leiden. These,
with many others, are the authorities to which the South African
lawyer still turns for information as to the common law of his country.
During the first half century of Dutch rule in South Africa the old law
barely held its own against the competing influence of English law.
To investigate and accommodate its principles to modern conditions
was the life work of that great jurist, the late Lord de Villiers, who,
appointed Chief Justice at the Cape in 1874 at the early age of thirty-
two, retained this office and subsequently the office of Chief Justice of
the Union until his death in 1914. In Natal, the other British colony
of South Africa, British influences had been predominant. The
Roman-Dutch law remained indeed the common law of the country,
but with a bias towards English law which was reflected in the statute
books.and in the docisions of the courts. In the Dutch republics also,
particularly in the Transvaal, English influences had made themselves
felt. But at the date of annexation the law of these territories retained
an archaic character which was afterwards partly removed by pre-
Union legislation. Simultaneously the decisions of the Transvaal
courts began to command an increased respect and importance. The
occasional clashes of judicial opinion between the courts of the Cape
and those of the Transvaal indicated that the work of Lord de Villiers,
great as it was, was yet not necessarily final. The work which he had
done-and admirably done-for the Colony was to be passed under
review by the court which owed its existence largely to his own far-
'That is, of the Province of Holland, one of the nine provinces of the United
Netherlands.
'English translation by Kotz6 (ig2I).
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seeing patriotism-the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
South Africa. This court as constituted by Section 96 of the South
Africa Act consisted of the Chief Justice of South Africa, two ordinary
Judges of Appeal, and two additional Judges of Appeal. These last
were to be assigned by the Governor-General in Council to the Appel-
late Division from any of the provincial or local divisions of the
Supreme Court, but were to continue to perform their duties as judges
of their respective divisions when their attendance was not required in
the Appellate Division. The experience of this court during the first
ten years of Union had shown that it did not possess the element of
permanence which is indispensable to the satisfactory working of a
court of ultimate appeal. Cases had occurred in which the Chief
Justice and the two ordinary judges of appeal being absent on leave
or from sickness, the majority of the court was made up of acting
members some of whom niight be members of the court from which an
appeal was taken. For the avoidance of such difficulties and to give a
more permanent character to the court, a recent statute, repealing
Section 96 of the South Africa Act, has established a court consisting
of a Chief Justice and four judges of appeal, all of whom devote them-
selves exclusively to the work of the Appellate Division. The policy
of this change is apparent as well from what has been said as from the
fact that the Constitution of the Union provides for no court of inter-
mediate appeal. This is perhaps a weakness in the judicial system.
No doubt different opinions may be held as to the value of a second
appeal, but English experience favors it, and the immense importance
of the issues committed to the Appellate Division might seem to make
it desirable. Happily the judicial quality of this court is of the very
highest order. In grasp of principle and in width and depth of erudi-
tion it can challenge comparison with any tribunal in the world.
The legislative output of the Union Parliament need not detain
us. It includes some consolidating and amending acts of the first
importance. Such are the Administration of Estates Act,10 the Patents,
Designs, Trade-marks, and Copyright Act,11 the Insolvency Act,1 2 the
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act,1 3 the Magistrates' Courts Act, 4
the Deeds Registries Act.' 5 These provide a code of law for the sub-
jects with which they deal. But uniformity is still to be sought in
the law of companies and of bills and notes. A Wills Act for the Union
might easily be framed and would remove some undesirable inconsis-
tencies between the laws of the several provinces. A uniform marriage
"Union of South Africa Sts. I913, Act No. 24.
'Union of South Africa Sts. 1916, Act No. 9.
"'Ibid. Act No. 32.
"Union of South Africa Sts. 1917, Act No. 31.
" Ibid. Act No. 32.
'Union of South Africa Sts. 1918, Act No. 13.
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law is scarcely attainable in a country where differences of race raise
fundamental questions of policy.
But it is of the development of the law by means of judicial deci-
sions that it is my principal purpose to speak. Space will not admit
of an exhaustive treatment of this interesting subject. It will be
enough, by means of examples drawn from various branches of the
law,, to illustrate the processes by which the system is being constructed
and reconstructed from day to day. An early case which came before
the Appellate Division illustrates in a very striking degree the high
antiquity of parts of the fabric. This was the case of Green v. Fitz-
gerald.'16 Action was brought to have the court declare void a bequest
by a mother to her children born in adultery. Ultimately the decision
turned upon the interpretation of texts in the Corpus Juris of Justinian
and their application in the law of Holland and of South Africa.
These texts, according to Voet,' declare that "incestuous and adul-
terous issue, being born of illegal relations (ex damnato complexu
natos) may not be.instituted heirs to any share by their parents, or by
any other title receive any sort of liberality from them." But an
examination of the original sources suggests a narrower interpretation
of their meaning. There is some reason to think that they relate (i)
to the issue of incest only and not of adultery; (2) perhaps only tb the
issue of incestuous marriages; (3) to succession from the father only
and not from the mother.'8 However this may be, the court decided
the question upon the broad ground that, the rule of the Roman-Dutch
law, which punished adultery as a crime, having become obsolete by
disuse, it would be unreasonable to penalize innocent issue of a union
which, no longer entailed criminal liability upon the parties to it.
Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa leax. The ground of the decision leaves
untouched the case of the issue of an incestuous union as well as the
rule of the Roman law which prohibited simple bastards' 9 from taking
more than one-twelfth under a father's will if there were also legitimate
issue surviving. But it is scarcely likely that these survivals from a
remote past will be allowed (should be question arise) to perpetuate
their existence in the modern law. The same principle determined the
decision of the majority of the court in the later case of Estate Heina-
mann v. Heinamann2 ° to the effect that, inasmuch as adultery has
ceased to be a crime in South Africa, all consequent penalties have also
fallen away, including the prohibition of intermarriage between persons
who have committed adultery together. In this case the court had to
brush aside not only texts of the Roman law prohibiting such marriages
I
[914] A. D. 88.
Commentarius ad Pandectas (1698-1704) 28. 2. 14.
"See the learned judgment by Kotz6, J. P., in Fitzgerald v. Green [igix]
E.D. C. 432.
"That is, not born in incest or adultery.
'1 [igig] A.D. 99.
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but also statutory enactments of the States General and of the States of
Holland of the seventeenth century. Two members of the court, how-
ever, refused to go this length. The above cases show how the court
will depart from old rules because they are adjudged to be inapplicable
to modem conditions. There is no question here of the influence of a
foreign system of law, unless it be said that the general feeling in favor
of freedom of testamentary disposition which characterizes the modern
law has been inspired from English sources. In another case the
influence of English law is more apparent. In Van Niekerk and Union
Government (Minister of Lands) v. Carter,21 the question arose as to
the ownership of the bed of a non-navigable public river. The riparian
owner held a crown grant of land which was expressed to be bounded
by the river. Did this carry a grant of the bed of the river usque ad
medium filum aquae? The texts of the old law left the solution of this
question uncertain, and the analogy of the English law was allowed to
incline the balance in favor of an affirmative answer. "In the absence
of any clear or authoritative rule in the South African courts on the
subject," said Soloman, J. A.,22 "I think that we should be well advised
to follow the English rule that the grant of a piece of land bounded by
a river must be construed as conveying the land, up to the middle of the
stream, unless it was intended to exclude the bed from the grant."
This case is interesting as illustrating the attitude of the court towards
English decisions. They are followed, so far as they are followed, not
because they are authoritative (and they are not), but because they are
reasonable in themselves, and not in disaccord with the principles of
South African law. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the
court exhibits any bias in favor of English law. American cases are
cited with equal respect though sometimes with little effect, owing to
"the great array of- authorities on both sides of the question. ' 23 Deci-
sions on the Scotch common law also receive attention since that system
"bears a close affinity to the law of Holland. '24 Rarely perhaps has
any court of justice been so favorably situated as the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of South Africa in its treatment of authorities.
Administering a system of law which is neither pure common law nor
pure civil law, but a mixture of both, it is heir to two great traditions,
inspired by each, enslaved to neither.
The fame of the controversy between consideration and cause in
relation to the law of contracts, lately set at rest by the decision of the
Appellate Division in Conradie v. Rossouw,2 5 has passed beyond the
limits of South Africa. In a series of cases which came before him in
the old Supreme Court of the Cape, Chief Justice, afterwards Lord, de
2'[1917] A.D. 357.
[I917] A. D. at p. 391.
[1916] A. D. at p. 521.
[i92I] A. D. at p. 498.
S[i919] A.D. 279.
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Villiers supported with all the weight of his great authority two proposi-
tions, neither of which can be lightly dismissed. The first was that,
whatever text-book writers may have thought or said, the courts of
Holland (apart from the special case of donation) did not give effect
to a promise which was unsupported by a quid pro quo. The second
was that this view was in accordance with the law of the Colony. This
interpretation of the law was not accepted in the Transvaal, and the
Appellate Division, a few years after Lord de Villiers' death, decided
against it. The case of Conradie v. Rossouw decided quite clearly that
a valuable consideration is not necessary to support a promise in the
law of South Africa. The doctrine of consideration being cleared out
of the way, the doctrine of cause is established in its place. But what
cause means, if it means anything at all, the decision in Conradie v.
Rossouw has scarcely explained.
The effect of this decision is to bring the law of South Africa, in
relation to the constituent elements of contract, into general conformity
with the law of other civil-law countries. Another divergence from
common-law doctrine is seen in the treatment of the stipulatio alteri.
As long ago as 1887, in the case of Tradesmens Benefit Society v. Du
Pree,26 Chief Justice de Villiers admitted the principle that a third
party may sue upon a contract made for his benefit, with the qualifica-
tion that there must be in existence "a binding engagement for valuable
consideration between the promisor and the promisee." Since the
establishment of the Union numerous cases have recognized the stipula-
tio alteri as firmly established in the jurisprudence of South Africa,
though the theoretical basis of the relations established by it have not
yet been completely elucidated. A recent instance of its application was
to the case of a contract entered into for the benefit of a company not
yet formed.2  The court was in some difficulty owing to the rule in
Kelner v. Baxter28 having been unreservedly adopted by the Privy
Council in an appeal from Natal.2 9 But a distinction suggested by a
passage in Grotins' de Jure Belli et Pacis"c was called in aid with good
effect. If A, without authority, contracts on behalf of B, he may do
so either as agent or as principal. In the first case there can be no rati-
fication by a principal not in existence at the date of the contract. In
the second case B may take advantage of the contract. "By our
law . . . . it is possible to contract independently for the benefit of a
third person; it is not necessary to do so as agent. Such a contract
when duly accepted by the-person for whose benefit it was made may
be enforced by him. I know no reason in principle why this right of
acceptance should be confined to cases where the third person was in
"5 Cape of Good Hope Sup. Ct. 269.
' McCullogh v. Fernwood Estate Ltd. [I92O] A. D. 2o4.(1866) L. R 2 C. P. 174.
Natal Land Co. v. Paudine Colliery Syndicate [1904] A. C. I2o.
" (I625) Lib. 2, cap. ii, sec. i8.
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being at the date of the contract. There is nothing in the authorities
which points to such a conclusion. The sole test is whether the offer
is open. And I cannot see why by our law a man should not himself
stipulate in favor of his unborn child, or of a company which he is
engaged in bringing into existence, leaving it to the beneficiary in due
time to decide whether or not he will accept the benefit offered." 31
It was said above that the court shows no bias in favor of English
law. Perhaps one might go further and say that it displays a bias,
inclination, leaning (I wish to find a neutral word) away from it. This
is natural. Union has engendered a growing sense of the "South
Africanness," of South African law. Where b few years ago English
cases alone would have been cited and the identity of the two systems
would have been unquestioned, this is no longer the case. One can
detect, I think, a desire to establish the sufficiency of the Dutch law to
meet new situations as they arise, and to trace its historical continuity
in the modern system. An instance may be found in a discussion by
the Appellate Division of the law of tender. "Tender," said Innes,
C. J., "is essentially a term of English law; and one is apt on that
account to regard it in the light of English practice. That was
certainly the case in African Agricultural Corporation v. Bouguenon,2
where none but English authorities were considered."3 3 But it must
not be inferred "that our doctrine of tender was rooted in English
law .... That is not so. It came to us from Holland; which accounts
for the fact that such limitations as those which in England prevent a
tender from being pleaded to a claim for unliquidated damages and
which confine its operation to the period before summons have never
been recognized in South Africa, so that in the absence of well estab-
lished practice to the contrary the incidents of tender must be regu-
lated by Roman Dutch Law. 3 4
It does not fall within the scope of this article to give a finished
picture, on however small a scale, of the legal system of South Africa.
The design has been to indicate its spirit and tendency. If the reader
will give himself the trouble of turning over the pages of any volume
of the reporis of the Appellate Division he will, if I may assume him to
be versed more particularly in the common law, find much that is
familiar to him, but he will find as much or more with which he is less
likely to be acquainted; and often the familiar and the unfamiliar will
be found strangely associated and combined. In the volume of the
reports for the current year he will find a rule of law as old as the
Twelve Tables recognized as forming part of the modern law of sales.
"Now the rule of the civil law was clear. The sale and delivery of
Innes, C. J., in McCullogh v'. Fernwood Estate Ltd., supra note 27, at p. 2o8.
= [19o4] T. S. 535.
"Odendaal v. Du Plessis [1918] A. D. at p. 473.
"Ibid. 477, 478.
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goods did not operate to transfer the dominium unless the price was
paid, security found or credit given. That principle was adopted in
Holland and has been recognised and enforced by our South African
courts."3' 5 On another page of the same volume he will find the
Praetor's Edict de nautis cauponibus et stabulariis applied to the ques-
tion of an hotel-keeper's liability to his guest for loss of baggage. 36
Another case raises important questions of criminal law.17 The Ameri-
can cases of Hicks v. Commoinwealth3 and Stabler v. Commonwealth"9
are cited and follow'ed. Yet another involves a claim to repudiate a,
contract as having been procured by misrepresentation. 40 Reference is
made to Halsbury's Laws of England, to Redgrave v. Hurd,41 and to
other English cases. Finally, there are cases which raise questions as
remote from English as from Roman law such as community of goods
between the spouses, or again, questions of native law and usage taken
in appeal from the native High Court of Natal. The general impres-
sion which the reader will derive from these reports and, if I have not
failed in my object, from this paper, is of a system of law singu-
larly rich in the sources that it draws upon, singularly unhampered in
the use that it makes of them; of a court which enjoys a liberty of
action scarcely to be paralleled in the history of modern states. Such
conditions call for judicial talent of the highest order. It is to be hoped
that the newly instituted universities of ,the Union will be successful in
establishing a scheme of legal education which will guarantee a succes-
sion of persons fit to carry on the' work of the eminent men who, in
every division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, are building up
a great system of law for generations yet unborn.
' Laing v. South African. Milling Co. Ltd. [1921] A. D. at p. 394.
"Davis v. Lockstone [1921] A. D. 153.
'Rex v. Nlhovo [1921] A. D. 485.
(1889) 86 Va. 223, 9 S. E. 1024.
(i88o) 95 Pa. 318.
'
0Karroo and Eastern Board of Exrs. and Trust Co. v. Farr [1921] A. D. 413.
' (1881) 20 Ch. Div. i.
